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Abstract 
For the first time in the agenda of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, during the 36'" Ordinary Session (2004), the death penalty 
was one of the issues discussed. Commissioner Chirwa initiated debate on the 
death penalty in Africa, urging the commission to take a clear position on the 
subject. She recommended that in view of the international and human rights 
developments and trends, it is necessary for the continent to initiate 
constructive debate on the question of the death penalty in Africa. It is against 
this background that this article is written, with the aim of showing that there 
is a need for constructive debate on the death penalty in Africa. Considering 
that the African Commission is encouraging such a debate, the article begins 
with an examination of its stance on the subject. This is followed by a brief 
evaluation of the use of the death penalty in Africa, highlighting some areas of 
concern. The death penalty in Africa is then considered from a human rights 
perspective, focusing mainly on the possibility of relying on constitutional 
provisions on the right to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment to challenge the death penalty. 
Introduction 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter)! makes 
no mention of the death penalty or the need to abolish it. 2 Different reasons 
'This article is partly based on research conducted for my doctoral thesis 'Towards 
the abolition of the death penalty in Africa: a human rights perspective' University 
of Pretoria (2005). I should like to thank Professor Frans Viljoen, the promoter for 
my doctoral studies, for his useful comments. 
"LLB (Buea); Maitrise (Yaounde); L1M, LLD (Pretoria). 
[Adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986 (OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5 (1982) 21 11M 58). 
2Article 4 prohibits the 'arbitrary' deprivation of life, which some could interpret as 
permitting the death penalty. Although falling short of total abolition, other African 
human rights instruments at least make reference to the death penalty. The African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children'S Charter), 1990 
(arts 5(3) & 30(e» and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women's Protocol), 2003 (art 
4(2)(j» place restrictions regarding the imposition of the death penalty on certain 
categories of persons - persons below eighteen years of age and expectant mothers 
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have emerged which make recourse to the death penalty appear necessary. 3 
Conversely, its use in Africa is increasingly becoming an obstacle to the 
realisation of justice and the development of human rights. 4 With the debate 
on the death penalty in Africa still emerging, in comparison with the 
international debate, studies on the death penalty in Africa are relevant. This 
article seeks to contribute to this emerging debate by evaluating the death 
penalty situation in Africa and providing the basis for any constructive debate. 
The stance of the African Commission 
The position of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(African Commission), set up as a monitoring mechanism under the African 
Charter, with regard to the death penalty is central to any constructive debate 
on the death penalty in Africa. Though the African Commission is encouraging 
debate on the question, it is disturbing that its position remains unclear and 
that it has not pronounced on the death penalty as such. This could mainly be 
attributed to the fact that it has not been presented with a direct challenge to 
the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, some Commissioners have openly stated their opposition to the 
death penalty or that they favour its abolition. For example, at the 
commission's 12th Session (1992), the late Commissioner Beye openly and 
explicitly identified himself as an abolitionist by stating that he was personally 
opposed to the death penalty.~ Also, Commissioner Umozurike has, though 
not explicitly, indicated his interest in the abolition of the death penalty.6 At 
the commission's 36th Ordinary Session (2004),1 Commissioner Chirwa made 
it clear that she favours abolition of the death penalty and urged the 
commission to take a stance on the issue. 
In November 1999, the African Commission passed a resolution urging states 
to consider a moratorium on the death penalty, to limit the imposition of the 
death penalty to the 'most serious crimes',8 and to reflect on the possibility 
of abolishing it.9 The adoption of this resolution was intended to encourage 
the trend towards abolition of the death penalty. However, it seems to have 
had relatively little effect, considering the current status of the death penalty 
or mothers of infants and young children. 
3These reasons include the arguments by defenders of the death penalty that it selVes 
as a deterrent, it meets the need for retribution, public opinion demands its 
imposition, major religions allow for its imposition and that the prison as a 
rehabilitative environment is ineffective. 
4As discussed subsequently in this article, the death penalty conflicts with, for 
example, the right to life, and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
5Examination of State Reports vol 3 (1995) 32 & 79. 
6F Viljoen 'Introduction to the African Commission and the regional human rights 
system' in C Heyns (ed) Human rights law in Africa (2004) 400. 
'Held in Banjul, The Gambia from 6-20 November 2003. 
8Unfortunately, this phrase has been left open-ended, without any indications of what 
the most serious offences are. 
9'Resolution Urging States to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty' Thirteenth 
Annual Activity Report (1999-2000) Annex IV. 
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in Africa10 and the fact that, as noted below, the death penalty is still being 
imposed in some African states for crimes that cannot be considered as most 
serious. 
Although the African Commission's stance on the death penalty remains 
ambiguous, it has come close to addressing the abolition of the death penalty 
in Africa generally, for the second time, in its recent decision in Interights et 
al (on behalf 0/ Bosch) v Botswana.l1 The commission acknowledged the 
evolution of international law, and the trend towards the abolition of the 
death penalty. 12 It further conceded its support for this trend by its adoption 
of the 1999 resolution. 13 In view of this, the commission encouraged all 
states party to the African Charter to take all measures to refrain from 
exercising the death penalty.14 It could be said that the commission tactfully 
concedes that the abolition of the death penalty in Africa is desirable. 
In earlier capital cases in which the issue of the death penalty was raised, not 
only in the context of fair trial rights, but also in the context of the right to life, 
the commission found a violation of the above rights. In Forum o/Conscience 
v Sierra Leone,15 for example, the commission found the execution of 
twenty-four soldiers after a trial that was in breach of due process oflaw (right 
to appeal) as guaranteed in article 7 (1 )(a) of the African Charter, to constitute 
an arbitrary deprivation of life under article 4 of the African Charter. 16 The 
commission has had more impact where the issue of the death penalty was 
IOAt present, only twelve African states have abolished the death penalty in law and 
practice. These countries are: Cape Verde (1981); Mozambique (1990); Namibia 
(1990); Sao Tome and PrIncipe (1990); Angola (1992); Guinea Bissau (1993); 
Seychelles (1993 but for ordinary crimes in 1979); Mauritius (1995); Djibouti (1995, 
only one person had received a death sentence since independence in 1977 and the 
sentence was commuted); South Africa (1997 but for ordinaty crimes in 1995); Cote 
d'Ivoire (2000); and Senegal (2004). 
"Communication 240/2001 17''' Annual Activity Report: 2003-2004 (African 
Commission). This Report was adopted by the Assembly of the African Union during 
its 4th Ordinaty Session, held in Abuja, Nigeria from 30-31 Januaty 2005 
(Assembly/AU/Dec S6(IV)). 
12Id at par 52. 
13Ibid. 
14In terms of art 62 of the African Charter, the measures taken have to be reported 
back to the commission. 
15Communication 223/9814''' Annual Activity Report: 2000-2001; (2000) AHRLR 293 
(ACHPR 2000). 
16Id at par 20. For other cases in which the commission arrived at a similar decision, 
see International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria 
Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97; Twelfth Annual Activity 
Report: 1998-1999 (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998); Amnesty International and 
Others v Sudan Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93; Thirteenth Annual 
Activity Report: 1999-2000; (2000)AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999); Amnesty International 
(On behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa) v Malawi Communications 68/92 & 78/92; 
Eighth Annual Activity Report: 1994-1995; Constitutional Rights Project (in respect 
of Lekwot and Others) v Nigeria Communication 87/93; Eighth Annual Activity 
Report: 1994-1995; (2000) AHRLR 183 (ACHPR 1995); Constitutional Rights Project 
(in respect of Akamu and Others) v Nigeria Communication 60/91; Eighth Annual 
Activity Report: 1994-1995; (2000) AHRLR 180 (ACHPR 1995). For a discussion of 
the above cases, see L Chenwi 'The African Commission and the death penalty' 
(2005) 11 Amicus Journal 13. 
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raised on procedural grounds, than on the right to life. Its decisions on fair 
trial rights have been progressive, and can be seen as procedural benchmarks 
in capital cases. 
In its jurisprudence, the African Commission has taken an approach similar to 
that of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, with regard to the 
relation between the right to life and fair trial rights. The Human Rights 
Committee is of the view that imposition of the death penalty following an 
unfair trial is a breach not only of procedural standards but also of the right 
to life. 17 Similarly, the commission is of the opinion that an execution after 
an unfair trial also constitutes a breach of article 4 of the African Charter. 
Considering the above, one could say that the African Commission's stance 
points towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa on grounds of 
human rights violations. The commission has subsequently (after the 36th 
Ordinary Session), included the death penalty in its agenda. IS 
The use of the death penalty in Africa: Some areas of concern 
With the current 'war' on terrorism in general, and the alarming increase in 
terrorist activities in Africa, discourses on the death penalty in Africa are 
becoming even more relevant. The war on terrorism in some African states has 
led to an increase in the number of offences punishable by death. For 
instance, following the suicide attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, the 
parliament of Morocco approved an anti-terror law that broadened the 
definition of terrorism and increased the number of offences punishable by 
death. 19 
Most African states still retain the death penalty despite the growing 
international human rights standards in general,20 and standards on the 
abolition or limitation of the death penalty in particular. International human 
rights standards, including those on the abolition or limitation of the death 
penalty, have therefore not impacted on most African states. The impact of 
these norms has been limited partly by the general perception of international 
law - as a threat to sovereignty in African states. Governments guard their 
sovereignty closelri and retentionist governments view such standards as a 
threat to their sovereignty, and are therefore hesitant to implement them. 
The discrepancies between international law and domestic law as regards the 
death penalty, are very apparent and disturbing in some African countries. In 
17Por a discussion of the decisions of the Human Rights Committee, see W Schabas 
The abolition of the death penalty in intemationallaw (2002) 112-113. 
18See the agenda of the 37th Ordinary Session of the African CommiSSion, from 27 
April to 11 May 200S, Banjul, The Gambia. available at www.achpr.org. 
19'Hands off Cain' The death penalty worldwide: 2004 Report (2004) 109. 
lOG en erally, the above standards are relevant as most African states are parties to 
major international human rights instruments, some of which aim at limiting the 
impOSition of the death penalty. Por the status of ratification of international and 
regional (African) human rights instruments by African states, see Heyns, n 6 above 
48 & 106. 
21C Heyns & F Viljoen, The impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on 
the domestic level (2002) 31. 
478 XXXVIII CILSA 2005 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone, for instance, those charged with the most heinous 
crimes by national courts can be sentenced to death, while similar persons 
cannot be sentenced to death under international criminal tribunals. 22 
What is more, the classification of some African states as de Jacto 
abolitionisr3 is an area of concern, necessitating a debate on the death 
penalty in Africa. These states still retain the death penalty in their statutes, 
which raises doubts as to their commitment to their de Jacto abolitiOnist 
status. It would appear that the fact that the death penalty is in their statutes 
signals their intention of resuming executions at some future time.24 Some 
African states have been previously de Jacto abolitionists for more than ten 
years, but are now retentionists. 25 Further, some current abolitionists had, 
in practice at some point put in place a moratorium on executions, or had not 
carried out executions for more than ten years, but resumed after this 
period. 26 The question then is why did the governments in these states 
resume executions? For some of the states, part of the reasons for the 
resumption of executions is clear. The resumption of execution in Burundi, 
for example, is as a result ofthe October 1993 massacres ofTutsi civilians that 
followed the assassination of the president. 27 In Comoros, the resumption 
of execution was justified on the basis that the death penalty is a deterrent. In 
1996, the year before the resumption of execution, Taki (then president of 
Comoros), in ordering the resumption of the death penalty, stated the 
following: 'Someone who is tempted to kill a fellow human being will think 
twice before carrying out his foul enterprise. ,28 In Libya, the resumption of 
execution could be attributed to political reasons as the first executions after 
nne penalties to be Imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is limited to imprisonment 
(see art 23 of ICTR Statute and art 19 of SCSL Statute). However, the national courts 
of both countries can impose the death penalty, as it is retained in their respective 
penal statutes. 
23De facto abolitionist states are those that have not carried out executions for ten 
years or more. 
24J'his has been an Issue of concern In Malawi. In the First Draft oftbe National Plan 
of Action for tbe Promotion and Protection of Human Rigbts in Malawi, it was 
stated that the fact that the death penalty has not been executed over the past years 
does not guarantee that it cannot be executed in the future. It was further stated 
that retention of the death penalty in the statutes is worrisome to the right to life. 
25Current retentionlst African states that have previously been de facto abolitionists 
include the following: Ubya for twenty-three years, but resumed executions in 1977; 
Cameroon for eleven years (1988-1997); Comoros for twenty-two years (1975-1997); 
Guinea for seventeen years (1984-2001); and lastly, Burundi for twelve years 
(1981-1993). 
2&rhese de facto abolitionist countries include: Benin, which had stayed for twelve 
years without carrying out executions, but resumed in 1986. The last execution in 
Benin was carried out in 1989, and there have been no executions up to the 
present date. The Gambia too, had not carried out any executions for sixteen years, 
but resumed in 1981. Since its last execution in 1981, no executions have been 
carried out up to the present date. Moreover, The Gambia abolished the death 
penalty in April 1993 but it was reinstated by the military regime in August 1995. 
27Amnesty International Deatb penalty/fear of imminent execution/unfair trial AI 
Index: AFR 16/07/00, 13 April 2000. 
2BAmnesty Internationall\frica: a new future witbout tbe deatb penalty AI Index: AFR 
01/003/1997, 1 April 1997. 
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23 years were for political offences. 29 Similarly, the resumption of execution 
in Chad in 2003, after a period of 12 years (1991-2003), has been attributed 
to security opportunism (the Chadian authorities used the rising insecurity in 
the country to justify the resumption of the death penalty) and the settling of 
scores leading to the manipulation of justice to hide the reality of crime and 
the identity of the authors. ~o 
For other states, it is not clear why they resumed executions after a long break. 
This is due to the lack of information on the subject, which is as a result of the 
fact that states do not take their obligations to report their practices on the 
death penalty to the UN seriouslyY Moreover, due to the veil of secrecy 
under which death penalty matters are handled, such reasons are usually 
regarded as state secrets and are not made public. 
Nevertheless, the resumption of executions could be attributed to the 
following: First, the symbolic nature of the death penalty or political reasons. 
The death penalty has been seen as one of the dramatic symbols of the 
presence of sovereignty in states where sovereignty is fragile, and the 
maintenance of the death penalty in such states is a demonstration that 
sovereignty could reside in the people. ~2 A state that is not able to execute 
those it condemns to death could be seen as almost overly impotent to carry 
out just about any policy. Second, the different reasons that have emerged 
which make recourse to the death penalty appear necessary. ~3 Third, the 
retention of the death penalty in their penal statutes provides the possibility 
of resuming executions. As long as the death penalty remains in the statutes 
of de facto abolitionist states, there is a possibility of their resuming 
executions at any time. The fact that only six abolitionists states in Africa have 
ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), aiming at the abolition of the death penalty,34 
reveals this pOSSibility. What is more, a 'practice'~5 does not exist that 
29Amnesty International Wben tbe state kills ... tbe death penalty v buman rights 
(1989) 168-169. 
3OInternationai Federation of Human Rights Deatb penalty: ending a moratorium, 
between security opportunism and settling of scores September 2004, available at 
http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id article = 1976. 
31R Hood The deatb penalty: a worldwide perspective (2002) 3. 
32A Sarat 'Capital punishment as a legal, political, and cultural fact: an introduction' 
in A Sarat (ed) The killing state: capital punisbment in law, politics and culture 
(1999) 5. 
33See n 3 above. 
34Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1989, entered into force on 
11 July 1991. The African countries that have ratified this Protocol are: Mozambique 
(21 July 1993); Namibia (28 November 1994); Seychelles (15 December 1994); Cape 
Verde (19 May 2000); South Africa (28 August 2002); and Djibouti (5 February 
2003). It should be noted that Sao Tome and Principe (6 September 2000); and 
Guinea-Bissau (12 September 2000) are signatories to the Protocol. 
35'Practice' here refers to an exercise that is constant (unremitting). Under 
international law, a practice has to constitute constant and uniform usage and can 
be found in, for example, the decisions of national courts, national legislation, 
diplomatic correspondence, policy statement by government officers, and opinions 
of national law advisers. See J Dugard International law: a Soutb African 
perspective (2000) 28. 
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demands a commutation to prevent executions in respect of all de facto 
abolitionist African states. This is so because the commutation of death 
sentences is not constant and no trend has been established towards 
commutation of death sentences in these states. Moreover, there are still many 
people under the sentence of death (on death row) in most de facto 
abolitionist states, implying that the commutation of death sentences has not 
been ongoing. 36 The fact that there is no 'practice' to commute death 
sentences in all abolitionists in practice states also goes to show that these 
states could resume executions at anytime. A constructive debate is therefore 
necessary in order to address the above. 
In practice, the death penalty is either mandatory or discretionary and is 
currently imposed in a number of African states for murder,37 crimes against 
property, 38 political offences,39 economic crimes,40 drug related 
offences,41 sexual offences,42 and religious dissent. 43 The fact that the 
death penalty is still being imposed for offences such as apostasy, committing 
a third homosexual act and illicit sex - which cannot be characterised as the 
most serious of offences - is problematic. Further, the possibility ofthe death 
penalty being imposed on persons below eighteen years of age in countries 
like Nigeria, for example, is a matter for concern.44 
Also challenging is the question of a mandatory death penalty. It is obviously 
one of the reasons for the on-going imposition of death sentences in the 
African continent. The death penalty is mandatory for offences such as treason 
and murder in Kenya and Malawi, aggravated robbery in Zambia, and murder 
in Tanzania. 45 This is a matter of concern as judges in such countries are 
under a legal obligation to impose the death sentence once an accused is 
found guilty, since it is the only punishment the law permits for the criminal 
offence in question. Mandatory death penalty for certain crimes has not been 
the main subject of challenges to the death penalty in Africa. Among the few 
36For example, in Uganda as of December 2004, there were 525 inmates on death 
row. In Kenya and Burundi, there were 946 and 533, respectively (see generally, 
Amnesty International Report (2005). 
37Zambia, Cameroon and Sudan. 
38Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia. 
39Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, Egypt, 
the ORC, Ghana and Nigeria. 
4<1ne ORC, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria and Algeria. 
41Mostly in North African countries. ... 
42Sudan, Egypt, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Morocco and Zimbabwe. 
43 Egypt, Libya and Sudan. 
44Section 39(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1990 and section 363 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1990 of Nigeria prohibit the use of the death penalty for persons 
below seventeen years of age. This falls short of international standards (for 
example, in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, and African Children's 
Charter) which sets eighteen as the age below which a person should benefit from 
the special protection of the law and prohibits the death penalty on anyone below 
eighteen. 
45Stated in the country reports of Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, presented at 
the First International Conference on the Application of the Death Penalty in 
Commonwealth Africa held in Entebbe, Uganda from 10-11 May 2004. 
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cases in which the issue has been raised, the judgment in Susan Kigula and 
416 Others v The Attornry General is worthy of note. 46 The petitioners in this 
case challenged, in the alternative, the mandatory death penalty in Uganda. 
The Constitutional Court found the various provisions of the law that 
prescribe mandatory death sentence unconstitutional as the individuals 
concerned are not accorded the opportunity to mitigate their death 
sentences. 47 
Though the mandatory death penalty for certain crimes has not been the main 
subject of challenges to the death penalty in Africa,48 its constitutionality has 
been subject to worldwide judicial scrutiny and conSideration, resulting in 
virtually unanimous condemnation of statutes providing for mandatory death 
sentences. For instance, in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the most recent 
series oflegal challenges to the death penalty deal with the mandatory nature 
of the death penalty for murder. 49 In addition, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has found the mandatory death sentence to be in violation of the 
right to life under article 6 of the ICCPR.50 
With regard to capital trials in Africa, initiating a debate on the death penalty 
is vital, considering that, more often than not, the law is not properly applied. 
Although fair trial rights have been enumerated in the national constitutions 
of most African states,51 some of the prOvisions are very inadequate, or not 
in conformity with the norms and standards of the relevant UN instruments52 
46Constitutional Petition No 6 of 2003, judgment delivered in June 2005. 
47Id at 40. The Constitutional Court went further to provide the government with a 
two-year period to give effect to the judgement, after which all death sentences will 
be set aside. It also held that the prisoners who have been on death row for more 
than three years are entitled to have their death sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment. 
48Currently in Uganda, a legal challenge to the death penalty has been brought 
before the Constitutional Court. The petitioners are also challenging, in the 
alternative, the mandatory death penalty in Uganda (see Susan Kigula and Others 
v The Attorney General; the legal challenge to capital punishment in Uganda: 1" 
draft of submissions on the proposed issues framed for determination before the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda, prepared by Mis Katende, Ssempebwa & Co 
Advocates). 
49J Harrington 'The challenge to the mandatory death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean' (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 126. 
5Drhe ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976 (GA res 2200A (XXI), UN Doc 
A/6316 (1996), 999 UNTS 171). 
51For example, arts 1 & 3 of the Constitutions of Central African Republic 1994; art 
10 of the Constitution of Djibouti 1992; art 19 and 20 of the Constitution of 
Ethiopia 1995; sec 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 1998; art 13 of 
the Constitution of Tanzania 1995; art 18 of the Constitution of Zambia 1996; the 
Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1996; secs 35 and 36 of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; sec 19 of the Constitution 
of Ghana 1996; sec 28 of the Constitution of Uganda 1995; and sec 23 of the 
Constitution of Sierra Leone 1996. The Constitution of Morocco 1996 is silent on 
fair trial rights. The years referred to are the years the constitutions were last 
amended as at March 2005. 
52A Adeyemi 'United Nations human rights instruments and criminal justice norms 
and standards' in M Bassiouni & Z Motala (eds) The protection of human rights in 
African criminal proceedings (1995) 4. 
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or those at the regional level. Also, investigations in the pre-trial phase are . 
hampered by lack of resources and training.H As a result, pre-trial detention 
becomes longer than required by the law. In Nigeria, for example, the pre-trial 
time in detention is rarely less than five years in some states, and in some cases 
over ten years. 54 This definitely has a negative bearing on the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system in dispensing justice. Furthermore, some African states 
have empowered special or military courts to pass death sentences without 
affording full fair trial safeguards." The African Commission has found such 
tribunals to be in violation of article 7 (fair trial rights) of the African 
Charter. 56 The UN Human Rights Committee has expressed concern over 
such courts in Egypt on the ground that it is not possible for defendants 
before them to have a fair trial.57 
Consideration of evidence, its admissibility, and the weight of such evidence 
are crucial in dispensing justice in trials, especially in capital cases. It could 
lead to injustice if fabricated or coerced evidence is admissible. Given the 
reported forgery and corrupt practices of some African states that still retain 
the death penalty, it is possible that a person may be sentenced to death and 
executed based on false evidence. For example, in Tanzania the corrupt 
practices in the criminal justice system have been confirmed by the president 
in the following words: 'What counts is money - those with money will always 
have judgments in their favour,.58 Corrupt practices in the criminal justice 
system have also been reported in Ghana and Nigeria. 59 
Also having a bearing on the administration of justice in capital trials, is the 
clemency process which is the last hope for a person sentenced to death, and 
is seen as the last means of correcting judicial errors. However, in most African 
states the process is shrouded in secrecy which allows for arbitrariness in the 
is the case in, for example, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Ghana, Uganda and 
Zambia. 
S4Amnesty International, 'Nigeria: the death penalty and women under the Nigerian 
penal systems' AI Index AFR 44/007/2004 10 February 2004. 
sSThis is the case in Sudan, TuniSia, Egypt and Eritrea. 
S6See for example, Amnesty International and Otbers v Sudan, Communications 
48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999) paras 68-69; 
Constitutional Rigbts Project (in respect of Akamu and Otbers) v Nigeria, 
Communication 60/91 (2000) AHRLR 180 (ACHPR 1995) para 13. 
s7Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the third and fourth 
periodic reports of Egypt submitted under art 40 of the ICCPR, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/76/EGY, 28 November 2002, para 16(b). 
s80pening address of the president of the Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency 
Benjamin William Mkapa, at the Judges and Magistrates Seminar, Dar es Salaam, 16 
December 1996. 
s9Report of the national coordinator of Ghana, Kristine Laney, presented at the 'First 
International Conference on the Application of the Death Penalty in 
Commonwealth Africa' held in Entebbe, Uganda from 10-11 May 2004; and E Anaba 
'Law and human rights: death penalty: optiOns for the government - study group' 
Vanguard (Lagos) 5 November 2004. 
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exercise of clemency and disparity in the granting of pardon or clemency.60 
The death penalty in Africa and human rights 
The death penalty is one of the most divisive human rights issues throughout 
the world. 61 Its application cannot be separated from the issue of human 
rightS.62 Defining the death penalty as a human rights issue has been resisted 
by some countries that retain and use the death penalty, as they reject the 
argument that judicial execution violates basic human rights, and regard their 
criminal justice system as a matter of national sovereignty reflecting their 
cultural and religiOUS values.63 At the 57'" Session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR), a Lybian representative stated that 'the death penalty 
concerns the justice system and is not a question of human rights'.64 
Although the abolition of the death penalty has not been accepted worldwide 
as an international human rights norm, for an increasing number of countries, 
the death penalty is a critical human rights issue. This view has been 
supported by the UNCHR, which has expressed its conviction that 'abolition 
of the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and to 
the progressive development of human rights,.65 Further, at the 36'" Ordinary 
Session (2004) of the African Commission Commissioner Chirwa openly stated 
that the death penalty was a human rights issue. Moreover, human rights 
instruments call for its abolition or restriction.66 
The right to life 
The African COmmission has emphasised the importance of the right to life in 
the following words: 'The right to life is the fulcrum of all other rights. It is the 
fountain through which other rights flow, and any violation of this right 
without due process amounts to arbitrary deprivation of life'.67 All human 
flOoJ'he Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has found a ofte right 
to life In a case where the applicant was not given an effective and adequate 
opportunity to participate in the mercy process (Aitken v Jamaica Case 12.275, 
Report No 58/02, 21 October 2002). This decision could be Instructive for African 
states, since the prerogative of mercy process is shrouded in secrecy in most states 
with defendants not being offered an opportunity to participate In the process. 
61T Fine 'Moratorium 2000: an international dialogue toward a ban on capital 
punishment' (1999) 30 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 421. 
62G Devenish The application of the death penalty in South Africa: its historical and 
jurisprudential evolution and hackground and its relationship with constitutional 
and political refonn (1990) 17. 
63Hood n 31 above at 18. 
MId at 17. Similarly, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago have asserted that the death 
penalty is not a human rights issue. 
M-rbis conviction was expressed in the UNCHR resolution 1997/12 of 3 April 1997 
and has been reiterated by the UNCHR In resolution 1998/8 of 3 April 1998. The 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudiCial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, in support of the above conviction, has emphasised that 'the abolition 
of capital punishment is most desirable in order fully to respect the right to life' 
(see Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, UN Doc E7CN 4/1997/60 24 December 1996 par 79). 
66For example, the African Children's Charter, African Women's Protocol, ICCPR, the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
67Porum of Conscience v Sierra Leone n 15 above par 20. 
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rights are of no significance without the right to life as 'life' is a prerequisite 
for the enjoyment of any other human rights. Accordingly, 'the right to life has 
been properly characterised as the supreme human right, since without 
effective guarantee of this right, all other rights of a human being would be 
devoid of meaning'. 68 Recognising the death penalty would, arguably, be 
denying the essence of this right, as the death penalty rejects the value of the 
convicted person's life. 
The right to life is guaranteed in article 4 of the African Charter. It allows for 
the death penalty only if substantive and procedural safeguards, and the 
restrictions on its imposition, are respected. Otherwise, its imposition will be 
in violation of article 4 of the Charter.69 Although there is little interpretative 
material to assist in construing article 4, this article has to be interpreted in the 
light of international law on human and peoples' rights.70 The African 
Commission is yet to adopt an interpretation of article 4 in the context of the 
death penalty. 
Constitutional protection of the right to life falls under two categories: 
qualified and unqualified right to life provisions. However, a few constitutions 
do not have a right to life provision. 71 As it is usually more cumbersome to 
amend the constitution than other laws, an explicit constitutional provision 
on the death penalty or a qualified right to life provision makes it difficult to 
challenge the constitutionality ofthe death penalty. Where the qualification is 
not clear, the possibility of relying on the provision to challenge the 
constitutionality of the death penalty would depend on the interpretation 
given to such a provision by the courts. The right to life is qualified, either by 
providing that it may not be deprived arbitrarily or other than in accordance 
with a sentence of a court of law, or by expressly stating the legality of the 
death penalty under the right to life provision. 72 
Some judges have taken the view that it is difficult to rely on clearly qualified 
right to life provisions to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
68See S Carlson & G Gisvold Practical guide to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (2003) 67. 
69See the jurisprudence of the African Commission discussed in Chenwi n 16 above. 
7°Article 60 of the African Charter. 
71These are the Constitutions of Gabon (1997), Egypt (1980), Libya (1977), 
Madagascar (1998) and Morocco (1996). Also, there are no constitutional provisions 
on the right to life in Somalia, as the constitution was suspended on 27 January 
1991 and in Swaziland, as the country presently has no constitution. It should be 
noted that the dates of the constitutions referred to in this article are the dates on 
which they were last amended. 
72Qualified right to life provisions are contained in the constitutions of Botswana 
(1999 art 4); Equatorial Guinea (1999 art 13(a»; Eritrea (1997 art 15(1», Ethiopia 
(1995 art 15); The Gambia (2001 art 18(1»; Ghana (1996 art 13(1»; Kenya (1999 
art 17(1»; Lesotho (2001 art 4 and 5); Liberia (1984 art 11); Malawi (2001 art 16); 
Mauritius (2001 art 4(1»; Niger (1999 art 33(1»; Nigeria (1999 art 33(1»; Rwanda 
(1991 art 12); Sierra Leone (1996 art 16(1»; Sudan (1998 art 20); Tanzania (1995 
art 14); Togo (1992 art 13); Tunisia (1991 art 5); Uganda (1995 art 22(1»; Zambia 
(1996 art 12(1); and Zimbabwe (2000 art 12(1». 
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For example, in Kalu v The State,n Iguh J pointed out that one of the 
fundamental basis upon which the South African Constitutional Court 
pronounced the death penalty unconstitutional is 'on account of the vital fact 
that the right to life in the relevant Constitution was unqualified'. 74 He 
therefore implied that it is difficult to challenge the constitutionality of the 
death penalty in Nigeria as the right to life in section 30(1) of the Constitution 
of Nigeria, 1979, was provided for in clearly qualified terms. Also, an attempt 
to have the death penalty declared unconstitutional in Botswana was 
unsuccessful because of the qualification in the Botswana Constitution. 75 
Therefore, challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty is problematic 
in African states in which the right to life is qualified in their constitutions. The 
approach adopted in Kalu has been endorsed by the Ugandan Constitutional 
Court in Susan Kigula and 416 Others v The Attorney General. 76 As a result, 
the Court found the death penalty to be constitutional, stating that it is an 
exception to the right to life, which is not included under the non-derogable 
rights. 77 
Furthermore, in countries where the death penalty is explicitly provided for 
in the constitution under a right to life provision, relying on the right to life to 
challenge the death penalty would be impossible, unless the constitution is 
amended or the provision on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, if not 
qualified, is used. In Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Sudan, for example, it would be difficult for the death penalty to be challenged 
based on their right to life provisions, as the constitutions of these countries 
endorse the death penalty. 
,. 
This notwithstanding, the Hungarian Constitutional Court found the death 
penalty to be in violation of the right to life inJones v Wittenberg,'8 in which 
the court had to decide on the constitutionality of the death penalty within the 
qualified right to life provision of the Hungarian Constitution. Section 54(1) 
of the Hungarian Constitution states that 'every one has the right to life and 
to human dignity and no one shall arbitrarily be deprived of this right'. In 
interpreting this provision, the court found the death penalty to be an 
arbitrary deprivation of life, by holding that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional on the ground that it is inconsistent with the right to life and 
dignity under section 54 of the Constitution. 79 This decision is very 
instructive for Africa, considering that the African Charter prohibits the 
'arbitrary' deprivation of life. 
While it is difficult to rely on qualified right to life provisions to challenge the 
death penalty, it is possible to challenge the constitutionality of the death 
73(1998) 13 NWLR 53. 
74As above, par 590. 
75See State v Ntesang 1995 (4) BCLR 426. 
76Susan Kigu/a n 46 above at 48. 
77Id at 22-23. 
78Decision 23/1990, 24 October 1990. 
79As above. 
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penalty in countries where the right to life is provided for in clearly 
unqualified terms. 80 This was the situation in South Africa. In both the 
interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 and the final Constitution Act 108 of 
1996, the right to life is textually unqualified. In S v Makwanyane,81 which 
addressed the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty, eight of 
the eleven judges considered the death penalty a violation of the right to life. 
The unqualified nature of the right to life was referred to by several judges and 
was used to support an argument that the right to life is given stronger 
protection in the South African Constitution.82 The court went further to use 
the qualifications of the right to life in other jurisdictions to explain why 
challenges to the death sentence have failed in those jurisdictions. 83 
From this, it is clear that African states such as Cameroon,84 in which the 
constitutionality of the death penalty has not yet been challenged and the right 
to life has no qualification, may follow the South African example. This is 
because the absence of qualification indicates that the drafters of the 
constitution in question intended the court, and not the executive, to deCide 
whether or not the death penalty should be retained. 85 
Whether or not a constitution has a limitation clause would affect the 
possibility of relying on the right to life provision in that constitution to 
challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty, irrespective of whether 
the provision is qualified or unqualified. This is because the death penalty 
could be saved by the limitation clause. For example, this was the situation in 
Tanzania when the constitutionality of the death was challenged. InMbushuu 
and Another v Republic,86 the derogation from the qualified right to life 
provision (including the provision prohibiting inhuman and degrading 
punishment) in the TanZanian Constitution, with regard to the use of the 
death penalty, was saved by article 30(2) of the Constitution.87 Article 30(2) 
allows derogation from basic rights of the individual in public interest. The 
Tanzanian Court of Appeal found the death penalty to be in the public's 
interest, as it was reasonably necessary to protect the right to life. 88 However, 
8Drhe right to life is unqualified in the constitutions of the following African states: 
Algeria (1996, art 34); Benin (1990, art 15); Burkina Faso (2000, art 2); Burundi 
(2001, art 21); Cameroon (1996, Preamble); Chad (1996, art 17); Congo (2001, art 
7); Guinea (1990, art 6); Mali (1993, art 1); Mauritania (1991, art 13); and Senegal 
(2001, art 7). 
811995 (3) SA 391 (CC), hereafter referred to as Makwanyane. 
82As above, par 85. 
83 As above, par 38. 
B4-fhe Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon (1996) guarantees 
the right to life in clearly unqualified terms. However, it is unfortunate that at 
present, the justiciability of the rights in the Preamble has not been tested, as the 
Constitutional Council, which has jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the 
Constitution, is yet to be established. 
85This was the interpretation adopted in Makwanyane, par 25 and footnote 33. See 
also the judgment of O'Regan J, par 324. 
86(1995) 1 LRC 216, hereafter referred to as Mbushuu (CA). 
87As above, 232. 
88As above. 
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the fact that in interpreting the above provision, the Tanzanian High Court 
arrived at a different conclusion, implies that the success of such challenges 
would depend on how a court interprets the relevant provision. For example, 
although the Interim Constitution of South Africa had a limitation clause, the 
death penalty was not saved by that clause because the requirements for 
limitation of rights provided under the limitation clause were not met.89 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the appropriate approach to the 
interpretation of a limitation clause, as pointed out by Justice Chaskalson, 
must be found in the language of the text itself, construed in the context of the 
constitution as a whole.90 This echoes the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights' opinion,91 to the effect that objective criteria of interpretation that 
look to the text themselves are more appropriate than subjective criteria that 
seek to ascertain only the intention of the parties. If courts adopt such an 
approach to interpretation oflimitation clauses, the basic rights of individual 
human beings would be protected. 
The prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
'Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment' has not been 
defined in human rights instruments. However, different bodies have 
established the various components of this prohibition.92 A plethora of 
international human rights instruments and national constitutions prohibit 
'torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment'. Article 5 
of the African Charter prohibits all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment and treatment. 93 
Most African national constitutions prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. However, some do not have such provisions.94 
Therefore, in Madagascar and Morocco, where the above provision does not 
exist in the their respective constitutions (and with no right to life provision), 
and in Senegal, where the right to life is unqualified, with no provision on the 
above prohibition, there is a pOSSibility to challenge the death penalty by 
relying on the above two rights.95 Also, there is a possibility to challenge the 
death penalty on the ground that it is cruel, inhuman and degrading in Liberia 
and Tunisia for example, since it is difficult to rely on the qualified right to life 
89Makwanyane, par 146. It should be noted that the onus is on the state to show that 
legislation meets the requirements in the limitation case, which it failed to do in 
the Makwanyane case. 
IJOAs above, par 115. 
91Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of 8 September 1983, Restrictions to the death penalty 
(arts 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights) Ser A No 3 par 50. 
92See the European Commission on Human Rights' decision in the Greek case, 
discussed in J Cooper Cruelty: an analysis of article 3 (2003) 3. 
~e right to respect of one's dignity is the only right in the African Charter 
described as 'inherent In a human being'. 
'l4-fbese include the constitutions of EquatOrial Guinea (1991); Uberla (1984); 
Madagascar (1998); Rwanda (1991); Senegal (2001); Taru;ania (1995) and Tunisia 
(1991). 
9'The right not to be subjected to cruel, Inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment and the right to life. 
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provision in their constitutions. However, this is restricted in countries where 
the constitution has a limitation or derogation clause. 
Similar to the right to life provisions in African national constitutions. the 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is either qualified or 
unqualified. This prohibition is qualified either by subjecting it to the law or 
exempting the death penalty from the provision. Examples of constitutions 
subjecting the above provision to the law include article 7 of the Constitution 
of Botswana 1999, article 74 of the Constitution of Kenya 1999, article 8(1) 
and (2) ofthe Constitution of Lesotho 2001, and article 20(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution of Sierra Leone 1996. The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2000 is the 
only African constitution that expliCitly exempts the method of execution and 
delay in the execution of the death sentence from the prohibition of inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment. 96 This presents an obstruction to 
challenges to the death penalty in Zimbabwe, with regard to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty or method of execution, based on the 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, some national constitutions prohibit cruel. 
inhuman or degrading treatment in clearly unqualified terms, thus making it 
possible to rely on the provisions to challenge the death penalty.97 However, 
reliance on the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is restricted by the presence of a limitation or derogation clause 
in some national constitutions. For example, article 24 of the Constitution of 
Uganda, 1995, provides in clearly unqualified terms that no person shall be 
subjected to any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Article 44 (a) further provides that notwithstanding anything in this 
Constitution there shall be no derogation from the enjoyment of the freedom 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. However, article 
43 provides for the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms in the public 
interest. 98 This appears to place a restriction on relying on article 24 to 
challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty in Uganda. However, the 
Supreme Court of Uganda, acting as a Constitutional Court of Appeal in 
Attorney General v Abuki,99 unanimously held that the right to dignity and 
the right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment or pupishment, when read 
96See art 15(1), (4). (5) and (6). Article 15(4) and (5) was drafted in this manner due 
to some of the (successful) challenges to the death penalty, in which the challenge 
was based on art 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See Chileya v S (1990) SC 
64/90 (unreported) and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 
v Attorney-General and Others 1993 1 ZLR 242. 
97See for example, the constitutions of Algeria (1996 art 34); Benin (1990 art 18); 
Cameroon (1996, preamble); Chad 91996 art 18), Congo (2001 art 9); Libya (1977 
art 31(c»; Mali (1993 art 3); and Togo (1992 art 21). 
9SWith regard to limitations of (restrictions on), and derogations from rights. see also 
the constitutions of Burundi (2001 art 50); Eritrea (1997 arts 26 & 27); The Gambia 
(2001 arts 17(2) & 35); Ghana (1996 art 31(10»; Guinea (1990 art 22); Malawi (2001 
art 44); and Nigeria (1999 art 45). 
99(2001) 1 LRC 63. 
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with article 44(a) are 'absolute and unqualified' .100 The Supreme Court was 
therefore of the opinion that there were no conceivable circumstances that 
would justify a derogation from the above right. 
Regrettably, in Susan Kigula and 416 Others v The AttornEry General,lol the 
Constitutional Court found the imposition of the death penalty not to 
constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 102 It seems awkward 
that the Court, in determining whether the death penalty was cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment under article 24 of the Constitution, relied heavily 
on the qualified right to life proviSion (article 22(1), arguing that the right to 
life is not included in article 44 on the list of the non-derogable rights and 
accordingly, articles 24 and 44 could not have been intended to apply to the 
death penalty permitted in article 22(1) of the Constitution. The Court further 
noted that, if the framers of the Constitution wanted to take away, by article 
24, the rights recognized in article 22(1), they would have done so in clear 
terms not by implication. 103 The Court's interpretation of the relationship 
between the respective articles is clearly restrictive. 
Also, the Constitution of Tanzania, 1995, has an unqualified prOvision on 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment but has a limitation clause, which 
restricts any challenges to the death penalty on the ground that it is cruel, 
inhuman or degrading. Article 30(2) of the Constitution allows derogation 
from basic rights of the individual in public interest. In the case of Republic 
v Mbushuu and Another,104 the constitutionality of the death penalty has 
been raised with regard to the right to life, right to dignity and right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. 105 The High Court 
found the death penalty to be inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading and 
also that it offends the right to dignity in the course of executing the 
sentence. 106 Based on the High Court's interpretation of article 30(2), it 
found the death penalty not to be in the public interest and therefore 
unconstitutional. 107 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the death penalty was inherently 
inhuman, cruel and degrading punishment,108 but declared it constitutional 
as it was saved by article 30(2) of the Constitution. 109 The Tanzanian case 
illustrates the restriction placed on challenges to the death penalty by 
limitation or derogation clauses. However, the extent to which a limitation 
IOOId at 88. 
IOISusan Kigula n 46 above at 48. 
I02Id at 24. 
IOJIbid. 
104(1994) 2 LRC 335, hereafter referred to as Mbusbuu (HC). 
IOsId at 340. 
I06Id at 351. The court noted that it is not just the final act of stringing up the 
prisoner that is an ugly matter but also the protracted tonnent to which he is 
subjected before execution. 
IOOId at 358. 
I08Mbusbuu (CA) n 86 above at 228. 
I~Id at 232. 
490 XXXVIII CILSA 2005 
clause will affect a constitutional challenge to the death penalty would depend 
largely on the way the courts interpret and apply the limitation provision. 110 
It is important for courts, when interpreting limitation or derogation clauses, 
to have in mind the underlying object of the provision guaranteeing the right 
in question, as it was adopted to protect against a violation of the particular 
right. The fact that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment is seen in most jurisdictions as non-derogable, should also be 
borne in mind. 
As noted earlier, the cruelty of the death sentence is manifested both in the 
death row phenomenon (prolonged stay on death row under difficult 
conditions) and methods of execution. Therefore, the death row situation and 
methods of execution in Africa should be considered in any constructive 
debate on the question of the death penalty in Africa. 111 The death sentence, 
in most cases inAfrica, is usually preceded by long confinement under difficult 
conditions, waiting to be executed. In the nineteenth century, executions took 
place within hours or days of a sentence of death, but delays have steadily 
increased in length, and more often than not are measured in years. 112 In 
Kenya for example, death row inmates have spent twenty years or more in 
jail. m Some prisoners have spent over ten years on death row in 
Ghana,114 and some prisoners served at least eighteen years on death row 
before being pardoned in Swaziland. 11.5 
The methods of execution in Africa are also a matter of concern in that they 
can be considered as cruel, inhuman and degrading. For instance, hanging has 
been described by Mwalusanya J as not only sordid and debasing, but also 
generally brutalising, thus defeating the very purpose it claims to be 
pursuing. 116 The most common methods of execution in Africa include 
hanging,117 shooting (usually by firing squad)118 and stoning. 119 There 
1l0See for example, the case of S v Makwanyane. 
lllThe need for such a protocol has been discussed in L Chenwi 'Breaking new 
ground: the need for a protocol to the African Charter on the abolition of the 
death penalty in Africa' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 89 (2005). 
I12p Hudson 'Does the death row phenomenon violate a prisoner's human rights 
under international law?' (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 833, 
834. 
I13See G Munene 'Plan to release death row prisoners' 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200307150153.html (accessed 22 July 2003). 
114See 'President grants amnesty to prisoners' 
http://allafrica.com/stories!Printable/200306300853.htm (accessed 4 July 2003). 
"'Hood n 31 above at 111. 
116Mbusbuu (HC), n 104 above at 343. 
117Hanging is used in Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, TuniSia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
118Execution by firing squad is employed in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DRC, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda. 
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also exist extra-legal methods of execution in Africa, as a result of the fact that 
people resort to infonnal justice. Infonnal justice has manifested itself in the 
African continent in genocide,120 mass executions and brutal killings, 
including political assassinations. Extra judicial executions by security forces 
in many African states and elsewhere are a matter of concern. 
Furthennore, the cruelty of the death penalty extends beyond the prisoner to 
the prisoner's family, to the prison guards and to the officials who have to 
carry out the execution. With regard to the impact of executions on the 
executioner, information shows that the role of the executioner can be very 
disturbing, even traumatic. Judges, prosecutors and other officials may also 
experience difficult moral dilemmas if the roles they are required to play in 
administering the death penalty conflicts with their own ethical views. A 
fonner prison warder in South Africa, Chris, is an emotional wreck today and 
suffers from severe post-traumatic stress, although it is years since he 
witnessed an execution. 121 
Conclusion 
The death penalty in Africa is an issue that one should be particularly 
concerned about. 122 In highlighting some areas of concern with regard to 
the use of the death penalty in Africa, this article has validated the need for 
constructive debate on its abolition. The article has, therefore, laid the basis 
for such a debate. For a debate on the death penalty in Africa to have more 
force, the African Commission has to take a clear stance on the subject, by, for 
instance, initiating the adoption of a protocol to the African Charter on the 
abolition of the death penalty in Africa. 123 
1I9Stoning is mostly occurs in states that apply the Sbari'a law, and is generally used 
for offences such as adultery. This method is employed in Mauritania, Nigeria and 
Sudan. 
!WIn Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. 
121Chris witnessed only a few hangings but they affected him in such a way that he 
assaults his wife as a result of his constant nightmares and stress. He stated this 
during a discussion on death and democracy broadcast on South African television 
('Special assignment' SABC 3 at 21h30 on 9 March 2004). 
122D van Zyl Smit 'The death penalty in Africa' (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law 
Joumall,2. 
J2The need for such a protocol pas been discussed in L Chenwi 'Breaking new 
ground: the need for a protocol to the African Charter on the abolition of the 
death penalty in Africa' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 89. 
